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COMMENTARY
THE FUNCTION AND DYSFUNCTION OF
PER SE RULES IN VERTICAL
MARKET RESTRAINTS
JOHN J. FLYNN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the Supreme Court held it did not know enough about the
"economic and business stuff" out of which nonprice vertical market
restraints "emerge" to determine whether they should be measured by
a "rule of reason" test or one of "per se illegality."' Seventeen years
later, after one flip2 and one flop3 (or vice-versa depending on your
view) by the Court and extensive academic speculation on all sides
of the issue,4 only one certain conclusion remains: We do not know
enough to generalize conclusively about the impact of a wide variety of
vertical nonprice restraints on the preservation of a competitive process
and the goals of antitrust policy, which the process seeks to achieve.
In the debate and court decisions, which continue to wrestle with
various aspects of the question, fixed theological convictions and fac-
tual speculation too often are substituted for a factually based, but
principled, analytical process. Court decisions appear to substitute
* Professor of Law, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. B.S., 1958, Boston College;
LL.B., 1961, Georgetown University; S.J.D., 1967, University of Michigan.
1. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
2. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (Court used "per se viola-
tion" test).
3. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) ("per se" test overruled
in favor of "rule of reason" test).
4. In addition to the articles cited by Professors Stewart and Roberts, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 727
(1980). other articles of particular note include: Altschuler, Sylvania, Vertical Restraints and Dual
Distribution, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1980); Bohling, A Simpllied Rule of Reasonfor Vertical Re-
straints Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REV. 461 (1979);
Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: .4 Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L.
REv. 91 (1979); Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1978); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramf-
cations of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979); Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A
Rule of Reason Decision ModelAfter Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 13 (1980).
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concept shoving, ad hoc ideological decisions, or factual speculation
about hypothetical cases not before the Court for a reasoned and un-
derstandable method for resolving .issues raised by controversies over
vertical nonprice restraints. Academic ddbate on the issue sometimes
proceeds from closed systems of fixed beliefs that claim the "oughts" of
the belief determine the "is" of reality or that the "is" of reality cannot
hope to do other than conform to the "oughts" of the beliefs wrapped
up in the model if the legal system would only allow reality to operate
free of intervention.5 Other commentators indulge in general factual
speculation derived from a particular hypothesis of limited observed
phenomena, by claiming that the general factual speculation or ob-
served phenomena can decide particular cases in the future only if
overriding weight be given that particular hypothesis or slice of reality.
One can read and ponder samples of each type of criticism and become
impressed by the logic of the analysis, the persuasiveness of the ap-
proach, and the sincerity of the advocate, yet conclude that we do not
know enough to reach firm conclusions about the antitrust implications
of vertical market restraints. If we did know enough about the "stuff"
of vertical market restraints, why then the growing number of law re-
view articles offering different approaches and opposing solutions?
The proliferation of divergent proposals for antitrust analysis of ver-
tical restraints makes clear that the Court's conclusions and method of
analysis in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 6 are just as in-
complete and full of unknown implications as the Court's conclusions
and methodologies in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.7 Some
aspect of the assumptions and methodology of each opinion, or the lack
5. These methods of analysis are characteristics of advocates making particular economic
models the premise of antitrust analysis. Not only are the assumptions of the model carried over
to antitrust analysis of specific cases, but also the deductive application of the method of the
school of economic analysis is carried into the legal analysis of specific cases. When this occurs,
only those factual explanations of the dispute consistent with the preordained model and its as-
sumptions are the permitted explanations of the conduct before the Court. Thus, the "oughts" of
the belief determine the "is" of reality. In the case of disciples of a rigid following of neoclassical
theory, who see most government intervention in the market as counterproductive to the "effi-
cient" functioning of the "market," they believe reality cannot hope but to conform to the dictates
of the "market" if the legal system would only leave it alone. For pre-Sylyania analysis of vertical
restraints with these tendencies, see Bork, The Rule of Reason andthe Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Divisions (p7. II), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition De-
cisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975).
6. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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of them, suggests that the Court has grabbed a few of the relevant is-
sues, but not all of them or even all sides of the few. The Schwinn
opinion made the test for legality and illegality a wooden application of
the venerable doctrine of restraints on alienation. The Sylvania opin-
ion, however, makes conclusive as a test for legality, the wooden appli-
cation of an abstract, artificial, and theoretical analysis of one brand of
neoclassical economic thought.' Both cases represent an either/or
mentality when reality, the facts of cases, common sense, the legal proc-
ess, and the goals of antitrust policy call for something in between these
bright line rules. Professors Stewart and Roberts demonstrate partially
why bright line rules are inadequate in their analysis of the implica-
tions of Sylvania for other per se rules and their proposals for resolu-
tion of the ambiguities raised by Sylvania. Their proposed solutions, a
series of complex rules stressing the quantitative impact of particular
restraints, however, strike me as theoretically titillating, but practically
unworkable and undesirable standards for efficient and effective imple-
mentation of antitrust policy in the context of the judicial process. The
problem is not one initiated by Stewart and Roberts because it is not
their analysis that generates the complexity. Rather, the Court's opin-
ion in Sylvania causes the difficulty. The problem is a broader one
than merely the manipulation of some of the unstated and often un-
realistic factual assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm implicitly re-
lied on by the Court in Sylvania in order to develop standards that
account for more of the reality of vertical market restraints than per-
mitted by the paradigm and Sylvania. A re-evaluation of the Court's
assumptions of fact and value, as well as the Court's skill in the use of
the legal process in Sylvania, is necessary to suggest sensible standards
for other areas of per se and rule of reason analysis.
In view of the limitations of the task Stewart and Roberts set out for
themselves, the Authors did not pursue extensively an inquiry into the
merits of the Sylvania Court's substantive assumptions and methodol-
ogy. They question instead the significance of some of the Court's
assumptions, account for a broader slice of the reality of vertical re-
straints than involved in Sylvania, substantially ignore the potential of
criticizing the Court's methodology, and compile a list of substantive
rules to determine--category by category-the outcome of future liti-
gation. It is a thoughtful and useful project, but one that does not go
8. See Flynn, The Role, fAnY, a/Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation-4 Response, 12
Sw, U.L. REV. - (1980).
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far enough in view of the significant implications of the Sylvania deci-
sion. Rather than limit this inquiry to the post-Sylvania vitality of
other per se rules in terms of the Sylvania analysis and methodology,
the task requires first a critical examination of the goals of antitrust
policy posited by Sylvania and shortcomings in the methodology by
which the Burger Court implemented those goals through a common-
law process of analysis.
Schwinn and Sylvania are symptomatic of some deeper problems in
both the evolution of antitrust policy and the Court's skill in carrying
out its function of enforcing the antitrust laws. These are problems that
will not be resolved by fiddling with this and fiddling with that to arrive
at a list of substantive rules tracking Sylvania, which one may carry to
future frays with the misguided confidence of a law student entering an
examination with an outline of simplistic rules but little understanding
of the policies behind those rules and no method for either intelligently
invoking them, determining their meaning, or applying them.
II. ASSUMPTIONS OF THEOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
Because Stewart and Roberts do not confront directly the Sylvania
Court's assumption of a particular brand of economic theory as the
theological predicate for analysis of vertical market restraints and the
methodology employed by the Court for making the theology decide
particular cases, the Authors engage in the practical task of divining the
implications of what is an unartful and inappropriate exercise of the
judicial process by the Burger Court. In Sylvania the majority identi-
fied several potential commercial justifications for imposing vertical
market restraints.9 The Court assumed that a manufacturer would not
ordinarily impose those restraints in light of the neoclassical theory that
assumes maximization of unit sales and revenues by a firm assumed to
be operating under the dictates of a perfectly competitive market, mak-
ing presumably rational decisions, dealing with presumably rational
distributors, and marketing to presumably rational consumers.' 0 The
9. 433 U.S. at 54-56.
10. The following observation is of a type found often in the Sylvania opinion:
Generally a manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price possible, once its price to
dealers has been set, because a lower retail price means increased sales and higher manu-
facturer revenues. In this context, a manufacturer is likely to view the difference between
the price at which it sells to its retailers and their price to the consumer as its 'costs of
distribution,' which it would prefer to minimize.
433 U.S. at 56, n.24 (citing Posner, 4ntitrust Palicy and The Supreme Courl. An Analysis of the
[Vol. 58:767
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Court used one kind of economic theorizing to test reality and used the
theory in the end of the analysis, rather than as a source for potential
insights to understand reality and as a hypothesis for the beginning of
analysis. Pyramiding assumptions to dictate conclusions should be at
least as objectionable in law as building rickety structures of inferences
on inferences to find facts. Conceptualizing economic analysis as one
brand of thought among many and making that brand of thought the
primary or sole goal of antitrust policy builds a dangerous inflexibility
and blindness into the law. The Court invited these risks by adopting
the neoclassical views of Professors Bork" and Posner"2 for not only
determining what the law ought to be in analyzing vertical restraints,
but also as the only basis for determining what reality ought to be used
in the analysis.
The "rationality" assumption of both consumer and firm, the "effi-
ciency" assumption of the functioning of perfectly competitive markets,
and the existence of a competitive market in conformity with the mod-
els as the parameters of the reality of the dispute before the Court, and
as expressions of the values that are permissible considerations for de-
ciding the case, provides an airtight syllogism for deciding all cases in
all categories of recognized per se violations despite the facts of any
particular case. Justice White's concurrence 3 and the post-Sylvania
comments of Professors Bork 4 and Posner, 5 which hoist the Court on
the twin petards of its assumptions and methodology with regard to
vertical price-fixing, serve to emphasize the consequences of adopting a
narrow view of the purposes of the antitrust laws and an axiomatic
method of deductive logic for implementing the law. Carried to its log-
ical extreme, the Court's analysis may jeopardize all horizontal per se
tests, absent a significant quantitative effect of a restraint that injures
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282. 283 (1975), and Note, 88 HAry. L. REV. 636, 641 (1975)). It is impossible to assess the
degree to which the Court assumed such speculation explains all reality, the reality of the case
before the Court, or what "ought" to be the assumptions underlying what "ought" to be the legal
standard governing vertical market restraints. In any event, it remains speculation and indicates a
tendency to decide real cases by postulating hypothetical ones.
11. Bork, supra note 5.
12. Posner, supra note 5, at 283.
13. 433 U.S. at 586.
14. Bork, Vertical Restraints. Schwinn Oyerruled, 1977 Sup. CT. RE. 171 (1977).
15. Posner, The Rule ofReason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Deci-
sion, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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"consumer welfare."' 16
If one begins with the proposition that the sole goal of antitrust pol-
icy is to maximize "consumer welfare" as defined by the fixed models
of one brand of economic theorizing and the imaginary workings of a
perfectly competitive market, which only permit a minor premise on
factual assumptions in accord with the models of the major premise but
not necessarily in accord with unvarnished reality, the operations of
deductive logic dictate the conclusion: Only those restraints that quan-
titatively displace the "market" and impair "consumer welfare" are un-
lawful under the antitrust laws because all others are either promoting
"consumer welfare" or will be efficiently remedied by the functioning
of the perfectly competitive market. Q.E.D. It is a conclusion, how-
16. Professor Bork has defined "consumer welfare" in a libertarian way by making the defi-
nition hinge on measuring economic performance and the scope of the law in terms of the impact
of judicial intervention on the operations of the "market," rather than seeing the court's function
as judging the validity of market intervention by private agreements in light of the goals of anti-
trust policy. He is allowed to offer this interpretation by virtue of the following definition:
"'Competition' may be read as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any state of
affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs
through judicial decree." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
61 (1978). "Basic price theory" is made the "criteria" for courts to determine whether their inter-
vention enhances "consumer welfare." Id at 84. The concept of "consumer welfare," like the
slogans "fair trade" and "right to work," has a popular and respectable ring to it but is not directly
defined. It apparently is defined in terms of business "efficiency. . .lowering the costs of goods
and services or. . .increasing the value of the product or service offered." Id at 7. By definition,
therefore, any judicial intervention not increasing "efficiency" is an inappropriate use of antitrust
policy. Shifting the focus of analysis from evaluation of the "efficiency" enhancing and other
consequences of private agreements that displace the competitive process, to the evaluation of
whether judicial intervention enhances "efficiency" in terms of neoclassical price theory carries
with it the implication that judicial intervention not meeting the criteria is anti "efficiency," use-
less, unwise or otherwise not appropriate under the antitrust laws. Moreover, attention is dis-
tracted from whether the private arrangement in question is efficient, not efficient, or neutral. The
presumed existence of perfectly competitive markets-a presumption of rather large dimensions,
questionable universality, and void of any reality in fact-apparently will serve to protect the
public interest in all cases where judicial intervention does not increase "efficiency" or the private
arrangement is not "efficiency" enhancing.
Although a useful line of speculation that calls attention to the factor ofjudicial intervention in
the calculus of what antitrust policy "ought" to be, the gross factual and theoretical constraints on
which the argument is built-as well as the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions one
must make to use the analysis with confidence-make the argument a dangerous one that se-
verely limits a process that is largely inductive and continuously confronted with sensibly resolv-
ing disputes arising in unvarnished reality. See Flynn, supra note 8. Cf. F. COHEN, THE ETHICAL
BASIS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1959) (arguing that every legal decision is an ethical one dependent
on inductive reasoning). It is also an analysis that does not comport with the language of the
statute or its purposes. Section 1 of the Sherman Act has not been amended to read: "Every
judicial decision not enhancing consumer welfare is hereby declared to be unlawful."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/3
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ever, we cannot claim as true or false or right or wrong because the
conclusion is assumed in the predicate.t" It is the logical fallacy of af-
firming the consequent. If the factual and legal postulates of the syllo-
gism are either not true or not true in all circumstances, then the worth
of the conclusion is worthless or nearly so. If the facts of the dispute do
not comport with assumptions of fact and value of the model governing
the decision of the case, then the decision is also misleading. Exporting
the result to determine the legality of other practices can only perpetu-
ate and aggravate errors imbedded in the original analysis. For exam-
ple, if the congressional purpose in adopting the antitrust laws is
broader than the narrow goals assumed by Bork, Posner, and presuma-
bly the Court in Sylvania, 8 or if some or all of the factual assumptions
underlying the economic model selected for analysis are inoperative,
the analysis is one that confirms the model, rather than sensibly deals
with the dispute and gives effect to congressional purposes. If Congress
adopted the antitrust laws to maximize sensibly distributor and con-
sumer freedom and choice as well as "consumer welfare" as defined by
manufacturer self-interest, or if factors other than maximization of
17. Moreover, the predicate is a value choice inescapably premised on complex moral choices
that cannot be ignored or buried beneath mechanical definitions of "efficiency," "consumer wel-
fare," or "price theory" if intelligent discussion of what the law "ought" to be or not be is to take
place. Felix Cohen has observed:
An ethics, like a metaphysics, is no more certain and no less dangerous because it is
unconsciously held. There are few judges, psychoanalysts, or economists today who do
not begin a consideration of their typical problems with some formula designed to cause
all moral ideals to disappear and to produce an issue purified for the procedure of posi-
tive empirical science. But the ideals have generally retired to hats from which later
wonders will magically arise.
F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 3. See also Wiles, Ideology, Methodology andNeoclassical Economics,
2 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECONS. 155 (1979).
18. This conclusion is difficult to avoid if one surveys the legislative history, what little there
is of it, in an open minded fashion and not as an exercise in conforming history to one's view of
what the law ought to be. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY-ORGANIZATION
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955) (the most comprehensive attempt surveying the legislative
history of the Sherman Act). Judicial decisionmaking in the context of a common-law process,
particularly when implementing the purposes of fundamental, but vaguely stated policies founded
in the Constitution and statutes like the Sherman Act, continually walks the fine line between
pouring new wine into old bottles and breaking old bottles by attempting to get the old wine out
or the new wine in. New insights and evolutions in reality must be accommodated to old values
through the flexible process of the art of legal reasoning. The limits of the judicial function in
relation to the legislative branch mean courts must not repeal or amend the old to conform to the
new. It is a process requiring the flexibility of inductive reasoning, a generous understanding and
appreciation of the past, the limits of the process, the function and functioning of the other
branches of government, and a capacity for self-reflection and skepticism that one's model for
reality or method for resolving some cases can resolve all cases.
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profits because of market imperfections motivated the manufacturer to
impose vertical restraints, or if consumers were unable to maximize
correctly utility in the context involved, an analysis that pretends other-
wise generates a false and specious certainty in the law, does not decide
justly the case before the Court, and frustrates goals of antitrust policy
not admitted by the Court's model for decisionmaking. Sooner or later,
a price must be paid because the law is failing to deal constructively
and creatively with the opaqueness of an ever shifting and changing
reality, the controversy before the Court, and the goals that the law is
expected to achieve. While there may be comfort, and even a feeling of
rectitude when the artificial assumptions of the model selected coin-
cide with one's metaphysical biases of what ought to be, it is a comfort
that comports neither with modem understandings of what legal analy-
sis or economic analysis is or ought to be. To one schooled in jurispru-
dence, this analysis is also a return to nineteenth century legal
positivism and the tunnel vision generated to the damage of both law
and the society that law is designed to serve. 19
The same criticisms may, of course, be made of Schwinn, in which
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation became the universal
talisman for determining legality and illegality for some vertical market
restraints. The wooden application of the principle, divorced from its
moral roots, current meaning, and practical consequences, soon gener-
ated dissatisfaction in the ranks of the decisionmakers.20 Predictably,
exceptions and exemptions quickly cropped up in the litigation because
reality does not conform to a rule or model that artificially presupposes
what reality is, ignores its complexity,2 or becomes detached from the
ends of the law and the complex process and concepts22 by which the
policies of the law are implemented in specific cases. Distorting or ig-
noring reality to serve the ends of a rule or model is no less dangerous
than distorting the goals or purposes of a law to make the law conform
to one's ideological fancy. In either case the certainty purchased is a
19. Leff, Economic Analysis of the Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv.
451,452 (1974).
20. Much of the dissatisfaction is summarized in ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2,
Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition (1977), and some of which are noted in the
Sylvania decision. 433 U.S. at 48, n. 14.
21. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935).
22. See Simpson, The Analysis of Legal Concepts, 80 L.Q. REv. 535 (1964) (criticizing various
attempts to explain the function and functioning of concepts in legal decisionmaking).
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false certainty. The public benefits claimed to result are an illusion.
Lofty sounding values like promoting "efficiency" or "consumer wel-
fare" may well turn out to be masks that hide the opposite result.
Broader goals of the legal process also may be jeopardized since fair-
ness, justice, and common sense become lost in such a mechanistic
process.
The analysis of Stewart and Roberts amply demonstrates the conclu-
sion that Schwinn found too many activities conclusively unlawful and
Sylvania held too many activities conclusively lawful. Their analysis
of Sylvania's logical implications for other rules of per se illegality is
also both enlightening and persuasive. Yet, I am not persuaded of the
wisdom of their conclusions as a means to escape the resulting quag-
mire or of the practical consequences of their specific proposals for re-
alistic enforcement of the law to govern vertical market restraints. The
quagmire has been generated by more serious difficulties than the
mental sloppiness caused by an unseemly haste on the part of the Court
to overrule Schwinn,2 3 a failure to articulate standards for a rule of
reason analysis of vertical restraints,24 or an indulgence in gross factual
assumptions like the magnitude of the "free-rider" problem in vertical
restraint cases on a record that presents slight evidence of a "free-rider"
problem or little specific evidence of any of the other speculative justifi-
23. Most of the Sylyania opinion is devoted to the accumulation of a variety of policy reasons
and factual speculation for overruling Schwinn. Aside from a general factual summary of Conti-
nental's claims at the beginning of the case, no detailed factual analysis of the case appears in the
Court's opinion. While a reproduction of the record in the case is an inappropriate form of
opinion writing, a general disregard of the facts and a failure to articulate why the Court con-
cluded the facts justified a test of "reasonableness" in the particular case before the Court is an
equally inappropriate form of decisionmaking. A fuller statement of the facts is found in the
lower court opinion. 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), aft'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
24. One can trace the Court's failure to articulate standards for its rule of reason analysis to a
number of factors including the case being tried under one theory of legality-illegality (the
Schwinn rule), the court of appeals majority deciding the case by legally defining the conduct as
not falling within the category of per se illegality that the lower court jury instructions were based
on, and the Supreme Court affirming the court of appeals' reversal and remand for further pro-
ceedings on grounds that the category of per se illegality the court of appeals found irrelevant and
the trial court found relevant is no longer a category of per se analysis for al vertical nonprice
restraints. The opinions pass like ships in the night without grappling with each other. While
these observations may undercut slightly the criticisms of note 23 supra, they make speculation
about the implications of the Court's mental process in Sylvania for other per se categories risky at
best. The peculiar posture of the case, in light of its prior treatment by lower courts, may have
contributed to the Court's failure to articulate what factors and facts are relevant to a rule of
reason analysis on remand and presumably other cases involving similar restraints.
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cations for imposing vertical market restraints. 25 Those difficulties in-
clude an unstated misperception of the goals of antitrust policy and a
breakdown in the appropriate methodology by which the Court should
analyze cases that raise the question of whether to adopt a per se or rule
of reason standard and how the standard adopted should be imple-
mented for analyzing a particular category of restraints. The Sylvania
opinion substituted axiomatic theological propositions for a reflective
analysis of the reality of the dispute before the Court in light of the
goals of the law. A mechanical deductive process of reasoning from
fixed rules has been substituted for what ought to be a complex induc-
tive and deductive process of legal analysis in light of the facts of the
case and the goals of the law.
III. THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
Sylvania left unclear the goals or purposes the Court believes anti-
trust enforcement achieves, although the majority clearly appeared to
emphasize the primacy of what are loosely called "economic" goals.
The majority in Sylvania noted: "Competitive economies have social
and political as well as economic advantages. . . but an antitrust pol-
icy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks. ' 26 A court that believes refuge in "economic analysis"
rescues it from moral, political, and social considerations obviously has
not thought deeply, or does not wish to, about the nature of the legal
process. Such a court is likely to integrate legal analysis and "economic
analysis" by disregarding "legal analysis," rather than making eco-
nomic insights subservient to the goals of the legal process. Moreover,
the implication that there are those who advocate divorcing antitrust
policy from economic concerns was neither supported by any refer-
ences, nor is it likely that the implication could be supported.
The inference that economic analysis provides "objective
benchmarks," while political or social concerns do not, is clearly unten-
25. This criticism is analogous to the problem in tort litigation of deciding particular cases
through analysis of hypothetical cases not before the court. See Thode, The Indefensible Use ofthe
Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause In Fact, 46 TEx. L. REv. 423 (1968). The possibility that
certain vertical restraints may enhance interbrand competition in some circumstances does not
mean they will do so in all circumstances. Nor does the possibility necessarily justify a conclusion
that the restraint should be lawful in those circumstances where interbrand competition is likely to
be enhanced. The latter determination is one of policy, not logic, and one that requires an articu-
lation of the goals of the law in light of the particular circumstances of the case.
26. 433 U.S. at 53. See also note 23 supra.
[Vol. 58:767
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able on a number of grounds. I have discussed elsewhere the question-
able "objectivity" of "economic analysis."27 The assumption is a
superficial one perhaps induced by claims that "economic analysis" is
empirically based, mathematically rigorous, and logically coherent.28
Research and speculation in other social sciences, as well as astrology
and numerology, purport also to be empirical, mathematically rigor-
ous, and logically coherent. One should not be seduced to believe,
however, that because we gain limited and transitory insights into some
aspects of reality that we have all "truth" or that the limited "truth"
that we do perceive is enduring, perpetual, and universal. Dressing the
analysis in the raiments of mathematics, deductive logic, and coherence
is no guarantee of the truth of the conclusions. Law should not rest its
judgments on the flimsy foundations of superficial efforts to be a "sci-
ence."
29
The post-Sylvania speculations in the courts and academia purport-
ing to be based on "objective benchmarks" of "market considerations,"
have spawned a multiplicity of conflicting decisions and proposals sup-
27. See Flynn, supra note 8, at - For a more elaborate analysis of the "objectivity" of
neoclassical analysis, see M. HOLLIS & E. NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN (1975); Wiles, supra
note 16.
28. See E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS As IF PEOPLE MATTERED
(1973) (an example of a humanistic approach to economics and a rejection of a quantitative and
mathematically based analysis). The empirically based, mathematically rigorous, and logically
coherent economic analysis of the post-Keynesians offers fundamentally different "objective"
standards to guide policy. See A GUIDE To POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (A. Eichner ed. 1980).
Post-Keynesian analysis also appears more persuasive in light of current circumstances. See Heil-
broner, A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, The New York Review of Books, Feb. 21, 1980, at
19, col. 1.
29. Cf. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955) (criticizing claims that the
Supreme Court's findings in the desegration decisions were "scientifically" based). Theodore Ros-
zak observed in his introduction to E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 28, at 8:
The great majority of economists' Schumacher laments, "are still pursuing the absurd
ideal of making their 'science' as scientific and precise as physics, as if there were no
qualitative difference between mindless atoms and men made in the image of God." He
reminds us that economics has only become scientific by becoming statistical. But at the
bottom of its statistics, sunk well out of sight, are so many sweeping assumptions about
people like you and me-about our needs and motivations and the purpose we have
given our lives. Again and again Schumacher insists that economics as it is practiced
today. . . is a "derived body of thought." It is derived from dubious, "meta-economic"
preconceptions regarding man and nature that are never questioned, that dare not be
questioned if economic science is to be the science it purports to be rather than (as it
should be) a humanistic social wisdom that trusts to experienced intuition, plays by ear
and risks a moral exhortation or two.
See also Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion, 50 VA. L. REV. 413
(1964).
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ported by extensive factual speculation not based on any particular ob-
jective study other than unverified assumptions of fact and value
underlying the proponent's analysis. One should not be surprised by
the chaos because an antitrust decision divorced from a deeper under-
standing of the social, political, and economic goals of the law and a
due humility for the complexity of reality cannot avoid generating con-
fusion. The chaos results because facts are detached from conse-
quences, inductive reasoning is suppressed by an excessive reliance on
deductive reasoning, and reality refuses to bow down to the syllogism.
Stewart and Roberts rightly challenge, but do not fully explore, the
merits of some of the assumptions made by proponents of a per se le-
gality rule for all vertical market restraints.30 For example, why should
a conclusive presumption be given a supplier's perception of the most
efficient way to distribute its product when that decision is imple-
mented by restricting or displacing the decision of independent distrib-
utors and consumers? Why is "efficiency" and "consumer welfare"
measured only in terms of supplier self-interest? A response predicated
solely on models of a particular school of price theory or pure competi-
tion is not enough. We all know that both models are figments of the
imagination and premised on a set of narrow and rigid hormative as-
sumptions that do not equate with reality while ignoring other factors
of legal significance that often seem to be at work in disputes worthy of
litigation.3'
One must begin with an understanding of the goals of the law, the
subservient role of economic and other analysis in the process, and a
sophisticated understanding of the methodology of the legal process in
order to reach principled, yet pragmatic, conclusions. Precedent will be
a useful guide, yet not a barrier to dealing with the facts of subsequent
cases. Analytical symmetry should be a feature of our understanding
of the law, yet neither its only goal nor its false god. Legal analysis is
30. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 4, at 742.
31. An imbalance of bargaining power between buyer and seller is frequently one factor
inherent in vertical market restraints, but usually ignored by "economic analysis." For an inter-
esting analysis of vertical restraints taking account of an imbalance in bargaining power, see
Goldbefg, supra note 4. Another factor not accounted for by "economic analysis" is the integral
function of time in the analysis. Deciphering short and long term consequences of conduct cannot
be done sensibly if time is ignored in the calculus. See J. HICKs, CAUSALITY IN ECONOMIcs 37-
38 (1979). A belief to the contrary is the equivalent of assuming that micro- and macroeconomic
theorizing can be connected sensibly by the indiscrete summation of individual supply and de-
mand curves.
[Vol. 58:767
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/3
COMMENTARY
an art, not a science. It requires judges to make judgments in light of
the policies of the law, rather than merely apply syllogisms to facts
served up for decision.
The general purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect and maintain
the competitive process from unreasonable displacement by contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies32 or by the unreasonable exercise or
possession of monopoly power.33 This general purpose is designed to
serve social, political, and economic goals. Even those who believe that
the goals of the law are purely "economic," cannot escape moral, politi-
cal, and social considerations in making that choice, giving it meaning,
or applying the choice to factual controversies. The policies, however,
behind choosing the competitive process as our fundamental method
for governing economic activity in the private sphere always have been
viewed as achieving goals broader than a materialistic measure of eco-
nomic "efficiency." Those goals are limited not only to the narrowly
defined and peculiar concepts of maximization of "efficiency" and
"consumer welfare," but also include, inter alia, the goals of insuring
that individual entrepreneurs succeed or fail on the competitive merits
and not by the dictates or conspiracies of others who unreasonably dis-
place the competitive process,34 maximizing intelligent consumer
choice, dispersing undue economic power, and subjecting private
power to the discipline of the competitive process in place of affirma-
tive government regulation. 35 They are goals whose meanings are not
32. It is the "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce" which § I of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nas-
cent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other. .. . And the amount of
interstate or foreign trade involved is not material . . . since § I of the Act brands as
illegal the character of the restraint and not the amount of commerce affected.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224, n.59 (1940).
33. [T]here can be no doubt that the vice of restrictive contracts and of monopoly is
really one, it is the denial to commerce of the supposed protection of competition. To
repeat, if the earlier stages are proscribed, when they are parts of a plan, the mere pro-
jecting of which condemns them unconditionally, the realization of the plan itself must
also be proscribed.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); Ral, Per Se
Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv.
1165 (1959).
35. See Blake & Jones, Towarda Three-DimensionalAntitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422
(1965); Leff, supra note 19; Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979); Schwartz, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 244 (1979); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1076 (1979); Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reections on Some Recent
Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1980); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciolines:
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frozen by values or conditions of the seventeenth century any more
than the conditions or the constraints of the eighteenth century froze
the meaning of the commerce clause and the first amendment.
Since the beginning of judicial experience with the Sherman Act, it
has been recognized that all contracts and many unilateral actions by
those engaged in trade literally restrain trade.3 6 The words of the stat-
ute, literally applied, appeared to require legal condemnation of every
activity having the prohibited effect of restraining trade. The dilemma
created has required the discovery of a principled and predictable
methodology for sorting out joint and unilateral conduct restraining
trade which "ought" to be found unlawful from conduct which "ought"
not to be unlawful. Courts and commentators have resorted to the an-
cillary/nonancillary distinction,37 per se and rule of reason analysis, 38
and the "gumball machine methodology" of using artificial economic
models as the major premise of a rigid deductive syllogism to dictate
conclusions without much regard to the facts of particular cases.39 In
the instance of gumball machine analysis, logic may provide the
springboard of the analysis, but it does not guarantee the success of the
dive or the eternal and general verity of the models made the premise
of the analysis. Reality often does not conform to the assumptions of
the models. The goals the law seeks to achieve are broader than those
permitted by the model. The process through which law is imple-
mented and the environment in which it is done imposes constraints
What Are the Sources of Wisdom For Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214 (1977) (surveys of the
goals of antitrust policy).
36. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897). In Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), Justice Brandeis observed:
The case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or agreement by which men
occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would
buy or sell during an important part of the business day, is an illegal restraint of trade
under the Anti-Trust Law. But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their
very essence.
Id. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1911).
37. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modfled, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
38. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940); Allison, Ambiguous
Price Fixing and the Sherman Act Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis?, 16 Hous. L. REV.
761 (1979). The Court's most recent analysis of the per se-rule of reason dichotomy is found in
National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
39. Flynn, supra note 8, at -.
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and responsibilities beyond those permitted by the methodology of eco-
nomic analysis.
Whichever methodology the courts have followed never seems to
work well for an extended period of time or provide a basis for decid-
ing all types of cases. For example, courts have held a restraint to be a
per se unlawful restraint in one circumstance and a lawful restraint in
other circumstances. 40 As Stewart and Roberts so ably demonstrate,
reliance on a strictly neoclassical analysis of the problem of vertical
restraints to the exclusion of all other considerations appears to sanc-
tion too many forms of conduct in conflict with antitrust goals. The
dilemma, in part, is one of articulating policy goals achieved through
preserving a competitive process as the rule of trade and finding a
methodology that permits a reasoned, efficient, and practical assess-
ment of the factual implications of specific marketing practices in light
of the goals identified and in the context of the legal process. The cho-
sen methodology must be one that is sufficiently flexible to account for
facts unique to the dispute, while balancing in a reasoned way the com-
peting goals of the law involved. The methodology also must be a
knowable methodology and produce predictable standards, which can
induce one to recognize like circumstances and be guided accordingly
in compliance with the law. The methodology also must be one capa-
ble of application in a like manner to like circumstances in subsequent
cases factually dissimilar. Neither Schwinn nor Sylvania meet these
criteria and thus the confusion and debate that follow both decisions.
Stewart and Roberts' analysis does not satisfy these criteria either.
They did not approach the problem in the aforementioned manner. It
is not fair to criticize the Authors for failing to follow the criteria be-
cause they performed a different task. Nevertheless, they have not
identified the goals of antitrust policy involved in vertical restraints
other than expressing the generality that antitrust laws are designed to
"promote competition and the free market system" and accordingly
must "pay deference to economic analysis and reality."' 4 1 But what is
"competition," "the free market system," "economic analysis," and "re-
ality"? When is deference "due" and "undue"? Stewart and Roberts
never clearly define these concepts or assess the "dueness" of the defer-
40. Van Cise, The Future of Per Se In Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964). For a more
recent analysis of the disregard of per se rules, see Redlich, The Burger Court andthe Per Se Rule,
44 A .. L. REV. 1 (1979).
41. Stewart & Roberts, supra n.4, at 749.
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ence to them. Although their concept of "economic analysis" is appar-
ently the neoclassical paradigm, their concept of "reality" indicates a
belief that factual conditions for operation of the paradigm do not al-
ways or even generally exist. If this is true, pretending otherwise neces-
sarily will not achieve the pre-defined "maximization of consumer
welfare" or "efficiency" because we must vary some of the variables of
the model. And, as Arthur Leff has irreverently pointed out with re-
gard to this kind of thinking: "[I]f you think you know what [will]
happen when you vary [one of] your variables, you're a booby."'42
Because I begin with a belief that antitrust policy was intended to
concern itself with a broader range of goals than those admitted di-
rectly by the neoclassical model and cannot avoid doing so, I believe
that it is necessary to proceed beyond the analysis of other vertical per
se restraints than those offered by Stewart and Roberts. The impact of
the restraint on consumer freedom to maximize choice and the freedom
of distributors to maximize their choice and efficiencies must enter the
calculus along with "efficiency," the "free market system," "economic
analysis," "reality," and the other goals of the law. The proposition
that supplier self-interest is a sufficient surrogate for these interests and
a reliable indicator of the facts of a case assumes too much about the
perfect functioning of the market and the coincidence of reality before
the court with the assumptions of the model. The proposition also ig-
nores a tradition of antitrust law in according weight to the values of
maximizing consumer choice and the independence of distributors
freely to act in their own self-interest for political and social reasons as
well as economic ones. The establishment of a sensible and desirable
balance among these often competing and conflicting goals within the
context of a bewildering array of potential factual circumstances can-
not be achieved by mechanical invocation of artificial economic models
or venerable legalisms from another age. A flexible, but structured,
methodology is required. The relative weight of the competing goals of
antitrust policy raised by vertical market restraints, the facts of the case,
and the qualitative effect of the category of restraint involved on the
ideal of a competitive process as the rule of trade must all be weighed
sensitively, efficiently, and inductively by the legal process.
42. Leff, supra note 19, at 476.
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IV. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS
I have argued elsewhere that recent antitrust litigation has generated
substantial confusion by the failure to pay much attention to the way
cases are analyzed or the method of analysis that "ought" to be fol-
lowed in resolving antitrust disputes.43 Most of the attention is focused
on what is decided and the merit or demerit of specific substantive con-
clusions on economic, political, social, or other grounds. The way cases
are decided is at least as significant as what is decided because method-
ology determines the range of the permissible legal and factual inquiry,
the degree of flexibility in the relevance and meaning of principles
found applicable, and the intellectual portability of the analysis from
one case to another and one category of conduct to another. Little or
no attention is paid to the Court's method of analysis by those seeking
to explore the implications of the Schwinn and Sylvania decisions for
vertical market restraints and other per se rules of illegality. Rather,
the category by category proponents of ad hoc substantive rules of le-
gality or illegality invite a comparison of resulting antitrust standards
to the Internal Revenue Code and other undesirable monuments to the
methodology of legal positivism and the folly of man in placing too
much trust in concepts and language to control the complexities of real-
ity, express the goals of the law, and dictate legal decisions in future
cases.
44
The primary source of the difficulty is the conceptualization of per se
43. Remarks delivered to the Sherman Act Subcommittee of Antitrust Section of The Ameri-
can Bar Association, by J. Flynn, Rethinking Sherman ActAnalysis: Three Proposals For Reducing
the Chaos, in Honolulu, Hawaii (August 5, 1980).
44. The insights of Dean Leon Green are particularly apt when considering the methodology
of Schwinn and Syvlania.
No natural or social science has found its secrets in words and phrases and neither will
the science of law. .. . There is no such thing as words so plain that they are not to be
interpreted. There are no premises to be found so certain that nothing more than an
irrefutable logic is required. . . A process which assumes the very ends it is employed
to discover will in the end betray its futility .... The attempt has been made and is still
made to make language do the service of judging itself. There can be no such substitu-
tion. Words are the machinery by which the power of thought is handled, but if there is
no such power put into them the words are lifeless. In the administration of law, both
the judge who surrenders this power to phrases as well as the judge who spends his time
attempting to pattern phrases to control succeeding judges in the cases to come, can only
do his science ill. . . . There is no warrant for the fear that a fluid language and adjusta-
ble rules are undependable. We have never had any other sort, although we have lost
much by not recognizing that fact. The point is we have looked to the wrong source for
dependability. We have sought it through a technic of language instead of a technic of
judging. We rather trust the machinery than its engineers.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1018-19 (1928).
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
784 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
and rule of reason analysis as two separate tracks of analysis. Each line
of analysis allegedly follows clearly understandable substantive rules
that are applied mechanically and deductively to the knowable facts of
a dispute. It is a difficulty that characterizes the methodology of both
Schwinn and Sylvania, where a rule-oriented mentality is carried too
far and generates future confusion and complexity without settling the
dispute before the Court or the general policy to be applied in other
cases. Unfortunately, the relevance and meaning of rules continually
shift in light of the facts of the dispute. In addition, the facts of dis-
putes worthy of litigation do not seem willing to conform to the fixed
meaning and objectives of the rules of Schwinn and Sylvania or the
economic models underlying the analysis for a deductive process to
work routinely. The frictionless application of a fixed rule to mechani-
cally produced facts replicating previous experiments can never take
place because the rule is not fixed and the facts of disputes never match
the assumptions of the model underlying the rule or the reality of prior
cases. The reasoning process is more inductive than deductive, with the
relevance, meaning, and application of rules each requiring a complex
and dynamic thinking process beyond the capacity of a "gumball
machine methodology" of analysis.
Courts usually are confronted with questions of an inductive nature
at any one or more of at least four points in antitrust litigation under
section 1 of the Sherman Act: 1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to
infer there is a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" within the
meaning of the antitrust laws?;45 2) whether the facts "ought" to in-
duce the conclusion that joint action "ought" to be presumptively un-
lawful46 or whether it is within or without a recognized category of
presumptively illegal conduct?;47 3) what evidence rebutting the pre-
sumption of illegality or establishing a justification for the restraint
45. Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (conspiracy
inferred from coerced parallel behavior) with Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) (parallel behavior standing alone is not a conspiracy). See also
Turner, The Defnition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962); Note, intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
46. See Redlich, supra note 40 for a recent survey of the adoption and evolution of per se
rules.
47. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Allison, supra note 38. The remedy sought in a case also may vary
the standard of proof of the category of conduct labelled per se unlawful. See United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will,
[Vol. 58:767
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/3
Number 4] COMMENTARY
"ought" to be either relevant or admissible in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case and the policies of the law?;48 and, 4) if the
evidence does not justify inducing the conclusion that the conduct is
within a recognized category of per se illegality, what factors "ought"
to be relevant and how should they be weighed in determining the rea-
sonableness or unreasonableness of the restraint?49 None of these
questions can be analyzed sensibly without a clear understanding of the
goals of the antitrust laws, the interrelationship of those goals in light
of the characteristics of the dispute, and the limitations and methodol-
ogy of the legal process in effectuating its function of implementing the
goals of the law, deciding the case before the Court, and providing gui-
dance for resolution of similar disputes in the future. The process by
which any one of the four questions is decided may require an ex-
tended evidentiary inductive inquiry into purpose, effect, benefits, det-
riments, horizontal or vertical nature of the restraint, power of the
participants, and/or unique characteristics of the activity or the indus-
try in which the activity occurs. ° Moreover, the subtle interplay
Developing Standards For Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. L. REV. 389
(1980).
48. Compare Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (joint licensing of copy-
rights not per se illegal price-fixing) with National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (joint limitation of bidding competition per se illegal price-fixing). The lower
court confusion in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980), a case raising the
issue of whether a conspiratorial elimination of short-term credit was horizontal price-fixing, ap-
peared to stem from the Supreme Court's failure to articulate standards for distinguishing per se
price-fixing from rule of reason price-fixing in Broadcast Music and Professional Engineers.
49. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States
v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918);
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977). The analysis of boycott cases frequently presents an issue of whether the conduct is a
boycott within the meaning of that antitrust concept or, even if it is a boycott, whether it is a
boycott warranting per se condemnation because of other factors or values deemed relevant. See
Missouri v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980)
(No. 79-2037); Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131
(1980). Adoption of Professor Bork's definition of competition as the predicate of antitrust analy-
sis of boycott cases, see discussion supra note 16, would result in overruling cases like Klor's
because judicial intervention does not appear to enhance "consumer welfare." The fact that a
conspiratorial displacement of the competitive process did not enhance "consumer welfare" and
excluded the plaintiff from business apparently would be irrelevant under Professor Bork's ration-
ale. His discussion of the boycott and individual refusals to deal cases does not reach these con-
clusions. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend what policy conclusions Bork advocates in these
areas other than the generality that all refusals to deal ought not be per se unlawful. See R. BoRK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 330-46 (1978).
50. See L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 467 (5th
ad. 1977) (factors generally involved in a rule of reason analysis).
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among each of these questions in the process of analysis may confuse
the analysis because doubt or certainty about one question (the exist-
ence of a "contract" for example) may tempt a court to manipulate the
factors necessary to answer one of the other questions.-"
In order to expose these kinds of issues to rational analysis, the per
se-rule of reason dichotomy should be recognized as a single eviden-
tiary methodology establishing burdens of proof of varying levels of
conclusiveness and nonconclusiveness to determine whether there has
been an unreasonable displacement of the competitive process. The
dichotomy should not be viewed as separate sets of rules and sub-rules
to dictate conclusions irrespective of the facts.5 2 Conduct that clearly
displaces, in a qualitative sense,53 goals that the competitive process
seeks to achieve or maintain is condemned on a presumptively, or
nearly presumptively, conclusive basis. Whether the conduct invokes
51. See Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 100
S. Ct. 3016 (1980); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
946 (1978); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrug Instrs., Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,373
(2d Cir.).
52. For a more elaborate explanation of the significance of conceptualizing the rule of rea-
son-per se dichotomy as a single method of analysis that establishes burdens of proof of varying
levels, see Flynn, supra note 43. The idea is not a new one. See Van Cise, supra note 40. Several
scholars, including Professors Stewart and Roberts, are gravitating to this view in the context of
vertical market restraints. See Bohling, supra note 4; Pitofsky, supra note 4; Zelek, Stem & Dun-
fee, supra note 4. It is appropriate to apply this methodology to the analysis of all cases arising
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. While many cases, particularly the ones not litigated, will
involve a nearly conclusive presumption of legality or illegality, those cases worthy of litigation
because ambiguity over some element of the offense will be analyzed more sensibly if this method-
ology is adopted. While difficult policy choices will not be resolved by this analysis, they will not
be ignored or confused as under the present methodology of the courts. Recognizable circum-
stances that trigger the inference of the necessary joint action category of per se conduct, level of
and permissible evidence of rebuttability or justification, and standards of unreasonableness will
evolve gradually. A reconsideration of existing precedent in light of this methodology makes clear
that this approach is one most courts have been in fact following even though courts have not
expressly identified the methodology. Some decisions appear to have no methodology of decision-
making in mind other than finding a rationale for denying plaintiffs a trial of their claims. See
supra note 51.
53. The "qualitative"/"quantitative" distinction is a traditional one in antitrust analysis, See
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Consideration
of quantitative factors, power of the defendant, or structure of the industry, may be relevant, but
subsidiary considerations in whether to draw the inference of conspiracy or whether it is a con-
spiracy to engage in presumptively unlawful conduct. See United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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the presumption, and the degree to which it is conclusive or not, de-
pends on the facts of the case in light of the policies of the law. For
example, any type of conspiratorial price-fixing, whether it is maxi-
mum, minimum, horizontal, or vertical, clearly displaces the competi-
tive process. Its qualitative effect on the ideal of a competitive process
establishing price, allocating resources, and other goals of the law, war-
rants condemnation in all but the most rare or unique circumstances 4.5
Price-fixing is a tampering with the "central nervous system of the
economy" 55 and an assumption of power we have conceded only to a
democratically elected government 56 and in circumstances requiring af-
firmative regulation.
The evidentiary presumption of illegality is a means to sort out the
facts of the dispute in the process of determining whether the goals of
the law have been violated. The quantitative impact of the conduct is
irrelevant in view of the centrality of our moral commitment to the
competitive process as the rule of trade if it is shown that joint action
that amounts to a contract, combination, or conspiracy has displaced
that process in purpose or effect. The statute outlaws an unreasonable
"restraint of trade," not the restraint of all or most trade. While market
structures and power of the participants may be relevant in some cases
to aid in determining whether to infer the existence of an agreement or
the category of restraint, the basic inquiry is a qualitative one in. light of
the goals of the law and not a quantitative one in light of the amount of
trade impaired.57 While the fairness implications of the sanctions im-
posed for such conduct may justify the requirement of proving purpose
and effect in the case of criminal sanctions,5 the fundamental duty im-
posed by law is one of not displacing the competitive process and its
goals. Whether the facts of a particular case "ought" to be found a
violation of the statute cannot be decided by the verbalization of rules
divorced from the facts. It is the paradox of legal reasoning that one
must know the facts to determine what rules are relevant and know
what rules are relevant to determine what facts are relevant. The rec-
54. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
55. Id
56. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In some circumstances
when regulatory powers have been delegated to quasi-private institutions, antitrust policy has
been relied on to extend due process constraints on exercises of governmental powers to the pri-
vate institution. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
57. See note 53 supra.
58. See note 47 supra.
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
788 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ognition of legal reasoning as both inductive and deductive is the first
step out of the paradox. The refusal to permit theological dogmas to
control the thinking process is the second step. A due appreciation for
the complexity of the goals of the law and the influence of facts in
determining the relevance, meaning, and applicability of concepts and
rules is the third step. Finally, the unravelling of the paradox is a mat-
ter of artistic skill and mastery of the legal process and its peculiar
logic.
Experience, the teachings of economics and other sources of knowl-
edge, and the political and social goals of the antitrust laws justify simi-
lar presumptively unlawful treatment of horizontal contracts,
combinations or conspiracies to boycott, to divide territories, or to di-
vide customers. The qualitative effect of such conduct on price, re-
source allocation, independence of traders, freedom of consumers, and
allocation of power in society is usually so pronounced that condemna-
tion is warranted except in the most unusual circumstances. Eviden-
tiary presumptions of illegality on a nearly conclusive basis are justified
once the conduct is identified. On occasion, even this most fundamen-
tal set of principles must yield to the unique circumstances of a particu-
lar case.59 The rigor of their implications also may necessitate
modification of the presumption by manipulating the concept of con-
tract or conspiracy or the meaning of a particular per se category to
avoid impractical or unjust results in certain factual circumstances.60
When the conduct is vertical in nature, values and goals behind the
policy of governing our economic affairs by a competitive process also
can be threatened; particularly intrabrand price competition, rights of
competing sellers, freedom of traders, and freedom of consumers where
the market is less than perfectly competitive. At the same time, how-
ever, vertical restraints also may promote, in some circumstances, inter-
brand competition, increase the efficiency and ability of traders to
compete, and enhance the consumer's ability to choose or to receive all
59. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846
(1966); Molenas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
60. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (combination of invest-
ment bankers syndicating new securities issue at a fixed price held a joint venture). A similar line
of analysis should have been considered in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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the benefits of the choice made. The dilemma usually is one of finding
a principled, yet flexible, process for sensibly sorting out the laudable
from the odious or unnecessary within the context of a specific case.
Fixed rules dictating consequences are not helpful in such circum-
stances. Elaborate constructs of rules of the type proposed by Stewart
and Roberts are neither helpful nor necessary. A more sensitive reform
could be adopted to avoid the unnecessary complexity and practical
difficulties of the Stewart and Roberts' rules that emphasize a quantita-
tive test for what is primarily a qualitative inquiry.
The treatment of per se rules and rule of reason analysis as a meth-
odology that creates evidentiary presumptions, rather than fixed and
rigid rules, offers a means for sensibly sorting out circumstances where
conduct should be permitted and where it should be condemned.
Lesser levels of presumptive illegality, and in some circumstances no
presumption of illegality or an affirmative burden of overcoming a pre-
sumption of legality, need to be developed in these circumstances. In-
deed a realistic appraisal of the Court's application of the per se and
rule of reason analysis in past cases suggests this is the course courts
have implicitly taken in other areas of antitrust analysis. Stewart and
Roberts verbalize some of their tests in a similar manner,6 but do not
quite abandon a rule-oriented approach and link most of their tests to a
quantitative measurement of market power and/or market structure.
Because of the conduct's impact on trader and consumer freedom
and the lessening of intrabrand competition, a presumption of illegal-
ity, without regard to market power or structure, is warranted as a be-
ginning guidepost to analysis when the conduct is a product of a
vertical contract, combination, or conspiracy explicitly imposing resale
price maintenance on territorial or customer divisions. The test is a
beginning guidepost because it is uncertain whether the facts will raise
the inference that the conduct results from a contract or conspiracy or
is within the per se category. It is not certain whether a justification or
excuse for the conduct is factually present in the case or warranted as a
matter of policy under all the circumstances unique to the -dispute.
Moreover, the test is a qualitative one because the legal essence of the
offense under section I is contractual or conspiratorial conduct that un-
reasonably displaces the competitive process. The inquiry is a qualita-
tive one not dependent on the amount of commerce displaced or even
61. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 4, at 758.
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that any commerce is displaced. The Authors' attempt to make the pri-
mary focus of a section 1 analysis of vertical market tests a measure of
quantitative market displacement not only greatly complicates the trial
of such cases and converts the analysis into a section 2 inquiry, but also
would require the reversal of substantial and significant long standing
legal precedent to the contrary.62
Before that additional chaos is brought on to comply with the impli-
cations of Sylvania, other means for sensibly moderating the overly
broad implications of both Schwinn and Sylvania should be explored.
The conceptualization of the per se and rule of reason methodology as
a series of evidentiary presumptions of varying levels of rebuttability is
a more convincing path to follow. The moderately presumptive illegal
classification of contractual air-tight vertical restraints as to price, cus-
tomers, and territories makes good sense. It provides a method for
sorting out the conduct in question in light of the goals of the law. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted when the conduct is motivated
by a good business justification in accord with the goals of the law, Z e.,
proof of an objective need to provide significant point of sales services,
efficiently market a product, gain entry into a market, or protect public
health or safety in light of peculiar risks associated with the product.
The restraint, however, should be ancillary to these otherwise lawful
objectives and no more restrictive than objectively necessary to over-
come the presumption of illegality--questions of fact that must be re-
solved in the circumstances of the restraint and peculiarities of the
business.
I have difficulties with several of the remaining standards proposed
by Stewart and Roberts with regard to other categories of vertical re-
straints. Aside from my skepticism with whether we yet have enough
"stuff" to presume some of them lawful, unlawful, or subject to "care-
ful scrutiny," many vertical restraints may not involve the requisite
contract, combination, or conspiracy for a section 1 violation.63 I think
62. Quantitative factors may in some circumstances aid in the determination of the qualita-
tive issues. See note 53 supra.
63. Unilateral refusals to deal, to enforce suggested prices in the absence of a monopolistic
purpose or effect, and unilateral territorial limitations or customer restraints do not violate section
I of the Act. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). While subsequent cases
may have limited significantly the Colgate doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29, 36-47 (1960); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939), the
extended evidentiary inquiry in cases where the element of conspiracy is in question is a vehicle
whereby courts determine whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade as well as determines
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other proposals, like the exception to a per se "rule" for horizontal re-
straints allocating territories based on "smallness" of the competitors, 64
contain no objective benchmark for the exception or appreciation for
the legal essence of the offense. These proposals might be better ana-
lyzed under joint venture principles or an evidentiary presumption of
illegality, which permits joint buying in some circumstances but not
division of customers and territories.65 I would not dismiss casually a
per se illegal evidentiary presumption against vertical maximum price-
fixing, with claims of "never justified" or "absurd. 66 Vertical maxi-
mum price restraints are not only a rare practice, but also are associ-
ated mainly with a monopolist's division of customers and territories.
In Albrecht v. Herald Co.,67 the leading case in which the question was
presented, the issue should not have been analyzed as a problem aris-
ing under section 1, but one arising under section 2 of the Act.68 In
light of my perceptions of the goals of the Sherman Act impinged by
the conduct and the factual context in which vertical maximum price-
fixing arises, I would be hesitant to conclude that a presumption of
the legal presence of an agreement. While the purely economic consequences of a coercive refusal
to deal may be identical to the conspiratorial arrangement to achieve the, same ends, the legal
consequences are not the same because the law has chosen to outlaw one means to the end but not
the other. Because the law's objectives are broader and more complex than under a purely eco-
nomic approach, it does not constitute a paradox for the legal system to select a different basis for
determining illegality (a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy") from the basis used by a
school of economic analysis ("efficiency" or "consumer welfare") to determine what conduct
should be allowed.
64. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 4, at 760.
65. In United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the combination may have
started out as a relatively small one of geographically dispersed local grocery chains engaging in
joint buying and private label marketing, but the combination did not remain relatively small or
limited to joint buying. By the time Topco was tried, joint sales of the chains amounted to $2.3
billion and the member chains possessed "much economic muscle, individually as well as cooper-
atively." Id at 600. The chains also divided territories and customers. The issue is the qualitative
effect of the conduct on the ideal of maintaining a competitive process. An inquiry that focuses on
the degree of "smallness" or "bigness" is not the end of the analysis, although they may be factors
in the process of analysis. A parsing of the practices involved (ie., joint buying, customer limita-
tions, territorial restrictions, and the like) in light of the goals of the law is of greater significance
to determine whether there is a displacement of the competitive process.
66. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 4, at 761.
67. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
68, The problem in .41brecht was one of whether The Herald engaged in a unilateral abuse of
monopoly power in light of the goals of the law and facts of the case. Permitting a monopolist to
have the advantages of vertical integration without the responsibilities of vertical integration by
allowing a monopolist to impose maximum price-fixing in the circumstances of .41brecht, is not
necessarily a wise, just, or appropriate result. See Redlich, supra note 40, at 21-24.
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illegality for vertical maximum price-fixing by contract, combination,
or conspiracy is not "justified." If the test for whether the rule is "ab-
surd" is the supposed "light" from Sylvania, the absence of much
"light" from Sylvania probably supports a conclusion that a test of pre-
sumptive illegality is justified in view of the impact of the conduct on
the independence of traders, intrabrand price competition, and the tra-
dition of narrowly circumscribing the exercise of monopoly power by
those seeking the advantage of vertical integration without its attendant
risks and burdens.
The conceptualization of per se rules as substantive rules that dictate
an either/or result precludes the evolution of sensible standards to sort
out conduct in the factual context of a particular case when pro com-
petitive and anticompetitive results become intertwined. The treatment
of per se-rule of reason analysis as a single methodology for allocat-
ing burdens of proof of varying levels of rebuttability permits a more
discriminatory evolution of knowable and practical standards. The sin-
gle methodology approach enables the process to strike a balance be-
tween procompetitive and anticompetitive effects sensibly in the factual
context presented by each case and in light of the complex goals of the
law. A rule-oriented approach, as in Schwinn and Sylvania, ends up
with an analytical process that focuses on the narrow goal presumed by
the rule adopted to the exclusion of other values that the law seeks to
achieve and ignores factors not admitted by the hypothesis underlying
the rule. The rule-oriented approach generates an irrelevant exercise of
the analysis confirming the self-fulfilling prophecies of the rule rather
than grappling with the reality before the court. This approach blindly
imposes per se rules of legality and illegality with the finesse of a meat
cleaver in circumstances where the skill of a surgeon is required.
Attempts to reason within the confines of a rule-oriented methodol-
ogy, while taking account of the wider range of values embraced by the
law and the rich variety of reality tossed up by the adversary process,
simply cannot work. The methodology also is unrealistic because it
does not permit a pragmatic weighing of the imbalance of bargaining
power between buyer and seller, risks that restraints that appear to be
vertical are inspired horizontally, the possibility that advertising is in
part directed toward imposing entry barriers by inducing irrational
consumer choice, or that the business justifications proferred for the
restraint are not present, justified in the circumstances, or sufficient in
light of less restrictive alternatives. Moreover, attempts to employ the
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analysis seemingly required by Sylvania, yet which take account of the
more complex reality of vertical market relationships, generate awk-
ward and complex legal standards that may be beyond the efficient ad-
ministration of the law. This is where and why I part company with
Stewart and Roberts' proposals for standards to deal with the other
categories of per se rules in light of the Sylvania decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The "stuff" for making fixed, universal, and eternal conclusions
about the legality of all vertical market restraints does not appear to be
at hand and never will be unless reality and our understanding of it can
be frozen in time and space. Relying on the methodology and assump-
tions of Sylvania to establish what "ought" the law to be in the case of
other per se tests of illegality is a traditional, but unwise exercise. Syl-
vania, with its narrow assumptions of policy and its rule-oriented ap-
proach, is just as objectionable as Schwinn as a platform from which to
assess other conduct of antitrust concern. The courts and the bar need
a principled, but flexible, approach that permits a broader and more
sensitive inquiry into the goals of antitrust policy, the facts of specific
cases, the practical features of various vertical market restraints, and
the gradual evolution of knowable standards grounded in the policies
of the antitrust laws, the methodology and limits of the legal process,
and the facts of reality.
Stewart and Roberts' analysis of Sylvania and its progeny amply il-
lustrate that Sylvania does not achieve these goals. Their proposed so-
lutions, constrained by the values and methodology of Sylvania, also
do not meet these criteria. Understanding per se-rule of reason analy-
sis as a methodology and a means to an end, and not as fixed rules that
define categories of legality and illegality, is the first step out of the
Sylvania quagmire. Per se and rule of reason analysis is a methodol-
ogy for allocating burdens of proof that range from relatively conclu-
sive presumptions of illegality to evidentiary presumptions of legality
determining whether the goals of antitrust policy are impinged in the
context of specific cases and categories of conduct. More predictable
standards will evolve gradually to guide lawyers in counseling their cli-
ents and litigating cases concerning the probability of the legality or
illegality of particular practices under all the facts and circumstances of
a case. It is, after all, a function of law to both guide and reflect reality
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in conformity with the basic long term values and goals of the commu-
nity.
The analysis of vertical market restraints in light of the Court's as-
sumptions and method of analysis in Sylvania demonstrates we are still
a long distance from fulfilling that function. Indeed, it is the paradox
of Sylvania that the Court erred in the same fashion as the Schiwinn
opinion by unartfully deciding too much. We ought not clone the error
by reproducing elsewhere in the law the implications of Sylvania
through a modified repetition of its assumptions and methodology for
decision by only varying the factual variables. The quagmire of Sylva-
nia is a deeper one, necessitating a re-examination of the Court's theol-
ogy and method for implementing it, if we expect to make sense of
antitrust analysis of vertical market restraints.
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